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The Funeral and Cemetery Boards
in Well-Deserved Limbo
by Julianne B. D'Angelo

In

legislature recently defunded the Dea relatively
unusual
move,
the
Affairs'
(DCA)
of Consumer
partment
Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers (BFDE) and the Cemetery Board (CB),
effective January 1, 1995. The statutes
creating both boards still exist, as do the
licensing requirements for funeral directors, embalmers, crematories, and cemeteries. But, as of January 1,no agency will
exist to accept applications, license new
entrants, adopt professional standards and
ethics codes binding on the death services
industry, or police violations of those standards through an enforcement system.
Why? Because the legislature failed to
appropriate funds to finance the operations of either board after January 1, and
it also failed to authorize either board to
spend any money it may secure.
The last time the legislature did this,
we cried foul. But that was in 1992,
when the legislature defunded the Auctioneer Commission in retaliation for a
lawsuit filed by the Commission challenging the legislature's theft of auctioneer licensing fees from the Commission's
special fund. Then, as now, the legislature simply defunded an agency and left
the licensing requirement intact.1
In 1992, the legislature was bullying
a helpless agency which had the temerity
to file a meritorious suit against it. The
defendant essentially destroyed the
plaintiff in order to prevent a court from
forcing it to obey its own laws. In 1994,
however, the legislature is finally refusing to kowtow to the bullying of a powerful industry which has been allowed to
run amok in California for decades,
causing injury and grief to California
consumers at times when they least deserve either.
The Center for Public Interest Law
(CPIL) has monitored the activities of
both of these boards for 14 years. And
for 14 years, the California Regulatory
Law Reporter has documented their failure to do anything substantial about
well-known abuses within the death services industry. These abuses range from
standard embezzlement of preneed ar4

rangement funds (which these licensees
are authorized to accept and invest), to
deceptive marketing practices through
the use of jargon-laden adhesive contracts, to macabre incidents such as the
commingling of bodies for burial or cremation and the theft of gold and jewelry
from dead bodies. These abuses have
victimized California consumers for decades, and the boards' failure to police
the death services industry has now resulted in:
- an excessive but necessary level of
oversight by both the executive and legislative branches;
- an increased number of class actions
and other lawsuits against both boards'
licensees-this litigation is now clogging and burdening our courts with disputes these agencies should have either
prevented or addressed through their regulatory programs; and
- dozens of revealin and embarrassing newspaper exposes.
Legislative Oversight. As these
abuses and their documentation mounted,
the legislature took a number of steps
which should have served as fair warning to both boards. In 1987, Senator Dan
Boatwright introduced a bill to merge the
boards; 3 Assemblymember Jackie Speier
introduced legislation to abolish them in
1992. 4 On three occasions since 1987,
the Legislative Analyst has called for the5
elimination or merger of both boards.
Over the past few years, the legislature
has been forced to hold several investigative hearings into the performance
of both of them. Between 1991 and
1993, the Assembly Consumer Protection Committee and the Senate Business
and Professions Committee held at least
two public hearings on them, 6 and Assembly Consumer Protection Committee
Chair Jackie Speier joined with thenDCA Director Jim Conran in a successful effort to compel the long-overdue
resignations of both
boards' executive
7
officers in 1993.
Executive Branch Oversight. Led by
former DCA Director Jim Conran, the
Wilson administration has consistently

expressed its dissatisfaction with the performance of both boards. 8 Following the
forced resignation of their respective executive officers in 1993, Director Conran
convened a Summit on Funeral and Cemetery Services (aka "the Death Summit") on September 22, 1993, to examine
problems within the death services industry and changes to the existing regulatory structure which would address
them. 9 In no uncertain terms, Conran
warned both boards that unless each implemented swift and sweeping reforms,
he would support their abolition or transformation into bureaus which would
0
function under his direct supervision.'
Marketplace Flaws Justifying Regulation. As the state's senior public interest organization covering the regulation
of trades and professions, CPIL was invited to represent consumers at the Death
Summit. We noted several marketplace
flaws which theoretically justify some
type of regulation of the death services
industry. The first is "external costs" or
"irreparable harm"-under our current
statutes, we allow these licensees to take,
invest, and administer millions of dollars
in preneed trusts and endowment care
funds, and there might be irreparable
harm in the form of permanent loss of
money if a funeral director or cemetery
licensee is dishonest or incompetent in
investing or managing these funds. A
regulatory system tailored to addressing
that flaw might require these licensees to
have training or education to ensure that
they have knowledge of their fiduciary
duty, as well as investment practices and
accounting. The regulatory mechanism
might also include some sort of fund or
bond to ensure that consumers who are
injured due to dishonesty or incompetence could be compensated where the
licensee is insolvent.
The second flaw justifying some sort
of regulation is consumers' lack of information about this industry-wherein decisions are compelled in an adhesive setting and market comparisons may be
problematical. More likely than not, we
"shop" for after-death services when we
are emotionally vulnerable, and the "repeat business" dynamic which serves to
excise incompetent or dishonest practitioners from other industries doesn't really apply as readily to death services.
When we purchase goods and services
from this industry, we are presented with
boilerplate legalese documents filled
with jargon we don't understand, and
those documents do not change from entrepreneur to entrepreneur. The number
of entrepreneurs in the industry is soaring in California, while the number of
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deaths in the state remains relatively
static. The high fixed costs inherent in a
funeral or cemetery business, coupled
with a finite amount of business and very
little competitive price advertising, results in extraordinary overpricing by the
industry in general and possible abuse of
consumers because of lack of information. 1 ' To address this flaw, our regulatory system should include stringent
"plain English" disclosure requirements
to ensure that consumers know what
they're purchasing and how much it's
costing them. No hidden costs, no hidden disclaimers.
The question we asked at the Death
Summit: Does the current regulatory system address these flaws in any meaningful way? Our answer: Absolutely not. Our
regulatory system includes two costly and
fragmented licensing boards to regulate
different (and competing) segments of
the same industry. And both boards have
utterly failed to address the reasons for
their existence.
The Boards'Records. In the area of
licensing standards, our system allows
funeral director and cemetery licensees
to take hundreds of thousands of dollars
in preneed arrangement money from
consumers and invest it, administer it,
account for it, and audit it. But our statutes require nothing of these licensees to
ensure that they have the slightest idea
how to do any of this. Our system requires them to be 18 years old, pay a
fee, and take a test which asks them
nothing about trusts, fiduciary duty, contracts, or investments. There are no minimum educational requirements; licensees don't even need a high school diploma.
Further, both boards-at the behest of
the industry-have repeatedly avoided
the adoption and enforcement of strong
disclosure requirements. The minimal
standards which have been adopted by
either board are riddled with loopholes,
and-as discussed below-noncompliance is routine and tolerated. For example, we have watched the Funeral Board
attempt to adopt regulations to define
and prohibit the practice of "constructive
delivery" (whereby funeral directors divert preneed trust funds from the trust
by delivering-not merchandise-but a
warehouse receipt for merchandise allegedly paid for with trust funds and put in
storage). BFDE is fully aware of this practice and knows how it operates to swindle
consumers. On at least two occasions
(1990 and 1993), it has talked about adopting rules to eliminate this practice, 12 and
has only just adopted them in July 1994under threat of abolition.

Another example: Funeral directors
are known to advertise that they "arrange
cremation services" under the heading
"cremations" in the telephone directory,
although they are not authorized to perform cremations. The Attorney General
says this is deceptive advertising. 13 However, the boards disagree about the
proper interpretation of the Attorney
General's opinion; for seven years, they
have simply "agreed to disagree" and ignored the opinion-leaving funeral directors free
14 to engage in deceptive advertising.
And the Cemetery Board is even
worse. Since 1975, its statute has required it to occasionally review and
amend its regulations regarding "standards of knowledge and experience and
financial responsibility" for cemetery
brokers. 15 However, the Board has never
complied; it has no regulations whatsoever regarding appropriate knowledge
and experience for trust fund administration and investment.
In addition to an inadequate licensing
system which fails to ensure competence
in the one area in which irreparable harm
can be caused, and little or no standardsetting by either board to clarify to the
industry what is and is not acceptable,
neither board has an adequate enforcement system to police and deter violations. During the past three fiscal years
for which statistics are available, the
Cemetery Board received a total of 339
complaints. It opened only 11 investigations and took only 2 disciplinary action. 16 During those same years, BFDE
received a total of 506 complaints. It
opened 329 investigations,
but took only
17
15 disciplinary actions.
In 1993, the Department of Consumer
Affairs finally dispatched its auditors to
evaluate the required audits of the preneed trust funds at four funeral homes
which had been "performed" by BFDE
staff. The results were frightening. DCA
found that the Board's audits of these funeral homes' preneed trust funds were
"seriously deficient"-the Board's auditors failed to adhere to professional standards in the preparation of these audits
and DCA's review of the audits was hampered by the poor quality of the workpapers.'a Even worse, the DCA audit revealed that the death services industry
pays no attention to BFDE. In these audits, the Board told the homes to take
anywhere from 15-20 corrective actions,
including restitution of trust fund money
to consumers from 1990-1992, but the
homes completely ignored the Board's
orders. 19 The Board is perceived as a
toothless paper tiger by the very industry
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it purports to regulate, perhaps because
it illustrates the most pernicious corruption of our system: the takeover of a public agency by private profit-stake interests.
Recommendations for Reform... At
the Death Summit, we urged both boards
to consider sponsoring legislation or
adopting regulations requiring education,
training, and testing which guarantees
competence in the administration of preneed trusts; stronger "plain English" disclosure requirements for preneed and endowment care contracts, so the average
consumer understands what he or she is
getting into; and the posting of an appropriate bond to ensure that there is a
fund from which injured consumers may
be compensated. BFDE requires no bond
whatsoever; the Cemetery Board requires
a minimal $10,000 bond for brokers,20
and a $50,000 bond for cemeteries which
maintain endowment care funds.21 Sounds
good, but even this bond has failed to deter
wrongdoing. We argued that the $50,000
bond requirement should be applied to all
funeral directors and cemetery licensees
which accept preneed or endowment
care funds, and that the amount of the
bond should be increased as the amount
of money in the trust fund increases. The
Health and Safety Code makes provisions for a less-than-$50,000 bond for
small cemeteries whose fund is
smal122 -why not require a larger bond
when the licensee has substantially more
than $50,000 in its fund?
We also argued that the two boards
were prime candidates for merger. There
is no reason to have two boards regulating competing segments of the same industry; our governmental structure need
not and should not reflect turf battles in
the industry. Many licensees in this industry are licensed by both boards anyway-the boards should combine their
resources and take advantage of the
economies of scale inherent in a merger.
...Ignored by the Boards. Although
DCA Director Conran directed both
boards to present him with 30-, 60-, and
90-day reports on their progress in implementing the reforms suggested at the
23
Death Summit, both boards ignored him.
Neither board submitted any report whatsoever until mid-February 1994-that is,
until well after both boards had been informed that Senator Dan McCorquodale
would soon introduce yet another bill to
abolish both boards and create a new regulatory structure.
SB 2037 (McCorquodale).Following
on the heels of the Death Summit, the
Senate Subcommittee on Efficiency and
Effectiveness in State Boards and Coin-
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missions held another oversight hearing
on the performance of both boards in
October 1993. In its final report issued
in April 1994, the Senate Subcommittee
recommended that both boards be abolished and that their regulatory programs
be merged into a bureau, finding that:
. the boards' investigation and enforcement activities are "ineffective and
non-existent,"
* neither board ensures the competence of its licensees in preneed/ endowment care trust fund investment and
management, and
- the boards are "very weak" in the
area24 of setting standards for the industry.
The Subcommittee's final report also
indicated that it did not favor a simple
combination of two ineffective boards. It
suggested instead that the new entity be
required to (1) adopt education, training,
and testing standards to ensure licensee
competence in their actual areas of practice; (2) establish stringent disclosure requirements for preneed and endowment
care contracts; and (3) look into the possibility of imposing a bond requirement
to ensure that there is a fund from which
injured consumers may be compensated
should the licensee declare bankruptcy or
25
otherwise leave the jurisdiction. To implement the Subcommittee's findings, Senator McCorquodale introduced SB 2037,
which would have merged both boards into
a bureau functioning directly under the supervision of the DCA Director. At the behest of the boards and the industry trade
associations, the Senate Business and Professions Committee amended SB 2037 on
May 18, 1994, to merge the two boards
into one board (instead of a bureau) and
directed the new entity to engage in
rulemaking to adopt strong consumer protection standards as recommended
by the
26
Senate Subcommittee.
To underscore and reinforce its support for the long-overdue structural
changes to these two boards then pending
in SB 2037, the legislature included in the
1994-95 budget bill-which Governor
Wilson signed on July 8, 1994-a provision appropriating only six months' worth
of funding for each board.2 7 SB 2037 was
to be the budget trailer bill carrying the
remainder of the 1994-95 funding for
merged board, and the continuation
funding was very clearly tied to and con28
ditioned upon the merger provision.
When SB 2037 reached the Assembly,
however, that house appeared to wilt
under the strong pressure exerted by the
death services industry to maintain the
status quo, and removed the merger provision. Although Senator McCorquo-

6

dale could have simply dropped the bill
to achieve defunding of both boards, he
sought and received the strong support
of his colleagues; by a 28-2 vote on August 31, the full Senate refused to concur
in the Assembly's removal of the merger
provision and the bill died. As a result,
both boards will run out of funds by January 1, 1995.
Thus, the Department of Consumer
Affairs, whose sworn peace officers are
authorized to enforce the provisions of
the Business and Professions Code, has
offered to take over both boards' enforcement programs and to work with
the legislature on creating a new entity
which is authorized to license cemetery
brokers, crematories, funeral directors,
and embalmers. At this writing, neither
board has accepted DCA's offer, instead
demanding loans which will enable them
to exist beyond January I-loans which
the legislature will surely refuse to approve. After twenty years of complete
nonfeasance, both boards continue to demand separate and continued existence.
Why These Boards Should Be
Merged. Several compelling reasons
justify the merger of these two boards.
First, contrary to the positions of the
boards and the industry, the death services industry is one industry which
seeks accomplishment of one goal: the
preparation, care, and disposal of a dead
human body in the manner desired by a
decedent or his/her survivors. The two
boards, which represent two competing
components of the death services industry, merely reflect two different approaches toward that same goal: funeral
and burial, or cremation. Simply put,
each board's licensees are authorized to
provide a service which the other board's
licensees are not-but frequently, the
services of both types of licensees are
required in order to achieve the desired
result. As noted above, the existence of
two separate boards reflects only the
industry's turf struggle-an inappropriate basis upon which to structure government in the public interest. Merger of
these two boards would enable a single
board to regulate an entire industry-as
opposed to the current structure where
two separate boards regulate parts of the
same industry, each often vying for competitive advantage vis-a-vis the other and
using the police power offices of the
state in the struggle. The fragmented nature of the state's current regulation of
the death services industry has resulted
in long-unchecked abuses which victimize consumers.
Second, merger of the two boards
would eliminate consumer confusion

which results from the existence of two
boards. When consumers feel victimized
by a member of the death services industry, they are frequently unable to determine which board to complain to
and-historically-have been given the
"runaround" by both boards, as indicated
by the almost moribund enforcement
numbers listed above.
Third, a merger would create efficiencies in the boards' enforcement systems.
Currently, if a BFDE inspector goes to
a dual-licensed premises, he/she is permitted to inspect only the funeral director/embalming aspects of the operation.
That inspector is not authorized to inspect the cemetery/crematory aspect; that
requires a visit from a CB inspector (if
it has one). Additionally, a merged board
with one fund could establish an auditing
unit which could audit both preneed trust
funds of funeral directors and endowment care funds of cemetery licensees.
The Protests of the Boards and the
Industry Are Too Little, Too Late.
Both boards have consistently opposed a
merger or restructuring, and so does the
death services industry. Their arguments
should be rejected once and for all.
- "But we have new leadership!"
Both boards argue they have new executive officers who are capable of leading
the boards out of their decades-long malaise. However, neither board had anything to do with the firing of their previous executive officers. The resignations of these individuals (James Allen
and John Gill) came at the behest of Assemblymember Speier and DCA Director
Conran. But for the actions of Speier and
Conran, Jim Allen and John Gill would
still be in charge of these boards.
- "But our enforcement statistics have
improved!" If in fact they have, this "improvement" has occurred only in the past
six months and is directly due to the pendency of SB 2037 (many agencies threatened with abolition suddenly spring to
life), the September 1993 Death Summit,
the Senate Subcommittee hearing in October 1993, and the actions of Assemblymember Speier and DCA Director
Conran.
-"But we were powerless to effectuate change!" At the May 9, 1994 hearing
on SB 2037 before the Senate Business
and Professions Committee, the trade associations of the death services industry
complained that they are not to blame
for the boards' poor performance, and
stated that they recognized the serious
problems in the industry but were "powerless" to do anything about Allen, Gill,
or either board. Actually, industry opposition stalled or killed every effort (ad-
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mittedly, there were few) by either board
to adopt regulations to remedy common
abuses. If industry representatives were
so concerned about inadequate regulation, they could have petitioned the
boards to adopt regulations or sponsored
reform legislation; they did neither.
- "But a funeral home is completely
different from a cemetery or crematory!"
This argument is also unpersuasive. Several DCA boards and bureaus regulate
29
two or more segments of an industry;
these agencies are completely capable of
recognizing any meaningful differences
between the industry components and
regulating accordingly. Other DCA agencies successfully regulate two distinctand sometimes competing-trades or professions. 30 There is no reason a merged entity could not successfully regulate the entire death services industry.
After 14 years of watching these
boards permit consumers to be abused
and victimized instead of policing abuses
and regulating the death services industry in the public interest, CPIL urges the
Wilson administration and the legislature
to withstand the pressure now being exerted by both boards, the affected trade
associations which long to maintain the
status quo, and other alleged "consumer
groups"-which are in reality tied to the
death services industry.
Consumers have a right to a regulatory mechanism which makes sense and
which attacks prevalent abuses in an industry. The current system is so bad that
no system is preferable; it is better to
have nothing to rely on and know it, than
to rely on empty promises and unfulfilled obligations.
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